Never has such force been assembled on so small a battlefield. If war comes to the Persian Gulf, more than 1 million soldiers will clash across a front no larger than Massachusetts. A 6,400-square-mile ring of fire will contain 15,000 armored vehicles and 4,000 artillery pieces. In the skies above: 2,500 combat aircraft, including squadrons of B-52 bombers and an array of fighters and fighter-bombers versus French-built Mirage and Soviet MiG fighters. According to military analyst David Evans, who is here covering the war, “it will be the biggest armored battle in history.” Combat aircraft will create over Kuwait “a partial eclipse of the sun.”
But are the allies ready? After spending two weeks in the gulf with old Army colleagues, I have some answers. Last month Lt. Gen. Calvin A. H. Waller, the deputy commander of Operation Desert Shield, raised hackles in Washington when he bravely said that U.S. troops would not be ready to go on the offensive until mid-February. President Bush seems to be leaning toward a much earlier attack, perhaps within days of the Jan. 15 U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. But taking out Saddam Hussein’s battle-hardened Army will not be a “quick, massive and decisive” fight, as Vice President Dan Quayle promised here two weeks ago during a PR blitz reminiscent of his National Guard tour as an official publicist. It could take up to six months, according to Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Desert Shield commander. My own estimate is in between: a best-case scenario suggests victory within 30 days.
History is filled with examples of impatient politicians pressing their generals to act before units are ready. Civilian leaders often think their commanders are too conservative. This is partially true. But senior military leaders are all too aware of the stakes of modern battle. In an all-out Persian Gulf conflict, casualties won’t be 200 Americans dead a week, as in Vietnam. They will be more like 200 dead an hour in the opening round-more if fuel-air explosives and chemical weapons are fired. Ultimately, no matter what the date of “K-Day” (for Kuwait), the assembled multinational force will win because of its unparalleled striking power. But preparedness minimizes casualties. Many field commanders are in effect asking the president: what’s the rush?
The concept of operation favored in the field begins with a massive air campaign, which could go for 30 days. The goal: to establish control of the ski and to destroy Saddam’s retaliatory capability. This means demolishing the Iraqi Air Force and air defenses. The Scud extended-range-missile sites are essential targets, too. Bombing and rocket attacks will seek to cripple Iraq’s system of command and control. Then the air attack will turn to pulverizing Saddam’s ground forces, acre by bloody acre.
In this phase, the allied ground forces would avoid decisive combat. They would en Army only enough to pin it do would be prepared to fight a mobile defense if Saddam’s Republican Guard lashes out in the attack. Only after air power had done its work would ground force move in to mop up. The envisioned battle, says Maj. Martin Stanton, an expert oil desert fighting now based with the Saudi Army, is “the kind of war we have been practicing at Fort Irwin [the Army Desert Warfare Center] for a decade … Saddam has put all his eggs in one sandbox that’s easy to clobber.” After seeing a videotape of the firepower available, Army Capt. Jack Pagano said, “I’m convinced that if Saddam Hussein knew what he was up against he’d walk rather than fight.”
That is the plan. But nothing in combat ever goes according to plan. Murphy’s Law says that if things can go wrong, they will - and those who have seen war firsthand consider Murphy an optimist.
If anything, General Waller’s mid-February ready-date is slightly optimistic. All indicators suggest that late February would be better. Operationally the multinational naval force is set to go, except for a temporary spare-parts shortage for U.S. Navy aircraft. The allied air forces also are ready. But the key to driving the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait is the ground element. And it is not ready if that word means prepared for all contingencies."
Perfect readiness is impossible: there are 18 countries in the U.N. ground-force team, and fighting abilities vary widely among them. Some, such as the British with their Challenger tanks (perhaps the world’s best), are battle-sharp. Others are more doubtful, as with units from Kuwait. As for the United States, which will field more than 70 percent of the total force, the level of preparation depends on the unit.
The U.S. Marine deployment to the gulf was a model military operation, and the leatherneck grunts are leaning forward in their foxholes. I have never seen American warriors in a higher state of readiness. The U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, which deployed early in August, is equally ready except for a heavy mechanized division now in transition training after exchanging older Abrams tanks and Cobra attack helicopters for more advanced models. The balance of the XVIII Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division, the elite 101st Air Assault Division and the crack Sixth French Division is like the Marines: locked and cocked.
The linchpin of the ground force is, however, the U.S. VII Corps. This three-division, European-oriented armored force was deployed only on Nov. 8, to give General Schwarzkopf an “offensive option.” Then it was delayed in passage by inadequate sealift and bad weather. It must undergo training to adjust to conditions completely different from the good roads and rolling terrain of Western Europe. Even its vehicles need work: their black and green paint stands out against the desert sand like charcoal eyes on a snowman. Commanders from units in the gulf since August say VII Corps needs another month to prepare for the knockout punch it will be asked to deliver.
Command and control among 18 nations also is a problem. So is logistics. Planners have performed a miracle in virtually moving a modern city of half a million people 12,000 miles, setting it down in the Saudi desert and getting it running in only five months. Still, until recently the forces were hobbled by the Pentagon’s disgraceful neglect of essential items like spare parts, ammunition, rations and fast-moving ships to get the stuff there. Had Saddam’s forces attacked Saudi Arabia any time between August and October, U.S. forces might well have been humiliated. Now the fighting units have their basic level of supply and depots are rapidly filling with the stocks required to support an offensive. Once the 300 cargo ships still en route arrive, Schwarzkopf will have Bush’s “offensive option” in hand.
Even so, senior officers here feel pressure from their commander in chief to meet a political timetable rather than a military one. This has forced them to consider a number of possible halfway courses of action, or C/As, as they are known in the soldiering trade. I have boiled them down to the three I think most probable. All assume an attack date soon after Jan. 15.
In the first option, on K-Day all ground forces except the still-unready VII Corps would conduct limited holding attacks designed to pin the Iraqi Army down while air and naval forces would conduct a massive bombardment against selected targets in both Iraq and Kuwait. The tank-heavy First Cav Division would be held in Central Command reserve. The bombing campaign would pause every three days for a stab at peace negotiations. This option would be the cheapest in terms of casualties.
Option two: on K-Day our forces would strike Kuwait and Iraq with a massive air and naval bombardment. Then on K plus 3 the U.S. Marines’ Expeditionary Corps would conduct a holding attack from the south toward Wafra in southern Kuwait and simultaneously conduct an amphibious assault along the east coast of Kuwait (map). Also on K plus 3, the multinational Arab Army would conduct a holding attack from the south toward AI-Jahra in central Kuwait. The U.S. XVIII Corps would conduct a sweeping attack north along Iraq’s border with Kuwait, then slash into Kuwait along a broad front toward Kuwait City, aiming to pin down the Iraqis and increase their vulnerability to air bombardment. The American VII Corps would be in mobile reserve behind the Arab Army, fitting out and preparing to react to an Iraqi counterstroke. The First Cav Division would be in theater reserve.
The third course is identical to the second, except that divisions of the American VII Corps would attack on K plus 6 into Iraq, to the vicinity of Al-Nasiriya, a town on the Euphrates River in southern Iraq. This would cut off the Iraqi defenders’ escape route. The First Cav Division would remain in reserve.
A common element in each scenario is a heavy reliance on air power. Back in Washington, the Pentagon’s air-power cult, with an eye on post-gulf budget cuts, has been singing the refrain that planes can do the job all by themselves. This kind of thinking was prevalent in Vietnam, where 6 million tons of bombs didn’t work. Nor does it consider that Iraqi air defenses are battle tested if relatively primitive. In open desert, the air-power solution sounds good. But seasoned ground officers are skeptical.
Schwarzkopf calls it “a bunch of hoo-hah,” recalling how Viet Cong soldiers would “just pop up” from their heavily bombed bunkers once the planes returned to their bases. Says Col. Bob Harkens of the XVIII Airborne Corps, who fought at much-bombed Dak To in 1967 and again at Hamburger Hill in 1969: “The only way an army buys real estate and wins wars is with infantry on the ground.”
Moreover, the aircraft arrayed in the gulf are the wrong mix of aircraft. There’s an overabundance of Top Gun planes that fly too fast and don’t stick around long enough to provide effective close air support to the units on the ground that will be needed to knock out the Iraqi force of more than 10,000 armored vehicles. There are fewer than 200 of the lumbering but lethal A-10 tankbusters affectionately known to ground warriors as “wart hogs.” Lt. Col. Bill Pitts, an A-10 pilot here, says, “The A-10 is like an ugly girl at an all-boys school: she’s not much to look at but everyone likes to have her around.”
Meanwhile, the Iraqis should give a good account of themselves against air attack. Their air-defense system has a large inventory of surface-to-air missiles, reportedly including U.S.-made shoulder-fired Stingers purchased during the Reagan administration and hundreds captured from the Kuwaiti Army, plus antiaircraft artillery. The Iraqi Army also employs a tactic used by the Vietnamese and the Iranians, in which each soldier shoots in a fixed direction during an air attack. The idea is that you can’t run through rain without getting wet, The aircraft flies into a steady stream of bullets. Simple, but efficient, More than 10,000 U.S. helicopters and airplanes were lost in Vietnam mainly because of this poor man’s air defense. Another major possible limiting factor of air power is visibility. If Iraqi forces torch the oil wells, refineries and pipelines in Kuwait, a thick blanket of black smoke will hamper all air activity.
The men and women of our armed forces in the gulf are the smartest ever fielded. All have a high sense of duty and are inspiring to see. Few want to fight, but there is no question that fight they will. Pfc. Scott Rogers of the Airborne sums up the view of most: “We’re all volunteers and fighting comes with the job.” The trouble is that for the most part, from rifleman to battalion commander, these dedicated soldiers and Marines have never seen war. And in my judgment they haven’t yet been made hard enough physically and mentally to survive the horror of potential combat with Iraq’s veteran Army.
Nor are they trained well enough for what is ahead. One day last week a soldier tossed a live fragmentation grenade without pulling the pin. He was made to do it again. This time, seemingly panicked, he pulled the pin, but held the ticking grenade for two seconds before tossing it, creating a few anxious moments for NEWSWEEK photographer Peter Turnley, standing only a few feet away.
It was the first grenade he’s thrown since arriving in August. The next day an antitank gunner blew off his leg and wounded four other soldiers. He thought the live round he was training with was a dummy round. The day after that a Marine crew fired nine SMAW (a direct-fire bunker buster) rounds into a simulated enemy bunker position and got only one possible hit.
With the approach of K-Day, the training has gotten tougher. But the shortage of ammunition has kept it from being close to the real thing. Live-fire training kicked off only in November. Before that the infantrymen sang out, “Bang! Bang!” on exercises, like kids playing war on the back lot. Many battalion-level leaders here complain that there is not enough artillery fired “danger close” to prepare their men for the crucible of combat. They rightly say that a well-trained soldier is confident and that leads to competence, which is vital to survival on any battlefield. Only 3,000 rounds of artillery have been used during training since August.
The leadership is professional, spirited, willing and able. They’re tactically competent and head and shoulders better than any group of small-unit leaders I’ve seen in the past 45 years. Their biggest fear is not the enemy or the tough job ahead. It’s that American military power will be restricted by politicians and our national resolve at home won’t hang in there until the job is done. Few trust members of Congress. Marine Cpl. Melvin Blazer, referring to Vietnam, said, “I just hope this time they just turn us loose and let us win.”
Field officers worry, too, about their equipment. Much of the Buck Rogers gear assembled in the desert is overcomplicated and undertested. A parachute major told me, “We have great soldiers and mediocre gear.” There is the Maverick air-to-ground antitank missile, for example. Many say it won’t work over a battlefield ablaze with burning tanks and other vehicles; the heat would confuse the missile’s infrared guidance system. Other antitank systems are equally questionable. The man-portable Dragon and AT-4 are called “paint scratchers” by the troops because they won’t penetrate the frontal armor of Iraq’s main-battle tank, the Soviet-built T-72. The vehicle-mounted TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile), which is the main antitank surface weapon, leaves the “gunner hanging out to fry,” as one old sergeant explained. The gunner must remain exposed atop the vehicle, eyeballing the target as the missile thunders home - as long as 15 seconds. One second with your head sticking up on a flat desert shooting gallery can feel like several lifetimes. There may also be a reliability problem. During a recent shoot, 12 TOW missiles were fired. Two were duds, four missed and only six missiles slammed into the stationary old cars used as targets. French forces here have the Milan, which allows the gunner to fire from the prone position. It proved to be a brilliant antitank weapon recently in Chad and served the British well in the Falklands. Yesterday the French Foreign Legion’s Second Regiment fired nine Milan rounds and got eight hits. I suspect that our warriors don’t have this effective system because it was not make in the U.S.A.
The Abrams M-1A1 tank - our top battlefield armor - zooms along at 45 mph and takes bumps like a Cadillac on a smooth road. It will outgun and outrun the T-72. But it is a fuel guzzler - a real liability in a roadless terrain where wheeled resupply vehicles will encounter difficulties. And a 1989 live-fire test showed that the tank’s electronics are vulnerable. They shut down if hit by shot or shrapnel. Moreover, there is no full-track mobile air-defense vehicle to protect the Abrams and its stablemate, the Bradley Armored Vehicle. Finally, there is the sand: it’s as fine as talcum power and quickly clogs moving parts, sealed electrical systems and eyes. The whirling winds create sandstorms and electrical disturbances that cause havoc to man and material and reduce visibility to zero. Tank brigades have been known to be lost in “brown-outs” (dust storms) for hours.
These conditions have already created havoc. The pervasive and stinging sand has frosted and eroded optical equipment, aircraft windwhields and canopies. Fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, vehicles and weapons have all been affected. Sand tears at the engines and rotors like sandpaper. Filters must be changed daily rather than monthly, engine life is reduced by two thirds, and engines and power packs must be changed at a much more frequent rate. If war comes, the tempo of operations will only increase. A Marine Corps report said that the long hours caused by the neverending maintenance requirements “are driving the Marines into the dirt.”
Still, these are soluble problems. Given more time and experience, most of them - like the chipping and eroding of helicopter blades that was an early critical flap - will be fixed. But more time may be something our forces don’t have. And this would be a blow to allied efficiency. In war, victory normally goes to the side which is the less inefficient of two inefficient forces bumping against each other. And an immutable corollary is that the lower the efficiency, the higher the casualties.
The Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Al Gray, recently cautioned about jumping off before being set. “What’s the hurry here?” he asked. “Time is on our side, not Saddam’s.” In World War II, it took four years to free France. Ike didn’t land at Normandy until he was ready, regardless of the insidiousness of Nazi Germany or the pressure of politicians.
Long ago the French statesman Talleyrand observed that “War is far too grave a matter to entrust to the military.” This may have been true when Napoleon was in charge, but in 1991 the relationship between politicians and generals has been turned inside out. The American generals in Saudi Arabia have the patience to wait until they’re ready. Now it appears that the politicians in Washington have a new charge: fire when ready, or fire when not.
Photo: Troops were toughened with live-fire training (above), a soldier took a break (left), a tank exercise got underway
Photo: A medical team practiced treatment of battle injuries at a desert field hospital
Photo: Iraqi soldiers took rifle practice at a range outside Baghdad
Photo: Navy pilots aboard the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt were headed for the gulf
Photo: Soldiers of the Eighth Tank Battalion took time out after breakfast to catch up with the news from home
The decision on an attack to recover Kuwait may hinge on allied polities. “It’s all scenario driven, and the president hasn’t settled on one date yet,” says a well-informed Washington source. But if President Bush believes the coalition is starting to weaken, he may decide to strike soon after expiration of the United Nations’ Jan. 15 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal. The first phase of the action would almost certainly take place in the air, as allied warplanes seek to destroy Iraqi air defenses, missile sites and unconventional weapons facilities (left). If ground forces are asked to take part in this phases, three options seem most likely:
Ground forces with the exception of VII Corps (still getting ready) conduct limited holding attacks in the border area. These pin the Iraqi Army down while massive Air Force and naval air bombardment of strategic targets proceeds - some 1,800 sorties a day. The bombing stops every three days to allow for peace negotiations.
The air and naval bombardment opens the campaign. On the fourth day, U.S. Marines strike into southern Kuwait by land and stage an amphibious assault on the eastern coast. Multinational forces move toward central Kuwait, and XVIII Corps sweeps north along Iraq’s border with Kuwait, then turns toward Kuwait City to pin the Iraqis down.
Essentially the same as Option 2, except that VII Corps is pressed into action. On the seventh day, VII Corps crosses into Iraq headed for the town of Al-Nasiriya. The goal: to cut off the Iraqis’ escape route, exposing them to further punishment from the air.
So what else was new? When Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz said last week that Iraq “absolutely” would attack Israel if war broke out in the Persian Gulf, it only underscored what most Israelis already knew: the Jewish state could all too easily be drawn into the conflict. The grim preparations were already well underway. Israelis bought bottled water and canned goods by the armload. Gas masks were everywhere. Almost overnight, “Chemical Warfare: A Family Defense Manual” became a best seller. Television, glutted with “survival” shows about sealing windows and storing food, offered a new Hebrew jingle: Ata muhan, ata mugan (“If you’re prepared, you’re protected”). And while thousands of foreigners and locals crammed Ben-Gurion International Airport, hoping to exit Israel before Jan. 15, the military was calling up reservists on an accelerated schedule and canceling leaves.
The more critical preparations were out of sight. Deep in the bowels of the Kiria - “the Compound,” a walled complex in central Tel Aviv-military leaders were pondering their response to the Iraqi threat. Would the Iraqis stage a symbolic strike with only a handful of their more than 100 missiles targetable on Israel? Did they contemplate a massive launch? What warheads would they use-conventional explosives? Or did they have the ability to deliver chemical weapons by missile? In any case, it was a worrisome prospect. “These are ballistic missiles, and once they are launched there is no way to stop them,” said a high-ranking Israeli officer. Concerned that Israel might decide on a preemptive attack against Iraqi missile sites-and risk splitting the allied coalition in the gulf-the White House sent Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Jerusalem last week. His brief-. to take Israeli hard-liners off the boil.
In fact, a preemptive attack seemed unlikely, though Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to rule one out. As Israeli military leaders see it, preemption brought victory in the 1967 Six Day War; inability to preempt in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was costly. In any case, Israeli practice when attacked is to retaliate swiftly and in kind. “If Iraq acts,” warned Gen. Avihu Bin Nun, head of the Israeli Air Force, “we will know not only how to defend ourselves but also how to respond in a way that will remove their ‘appetite’.”
Israel’s options are relatively narrow. If Iraq made a small-scale launch of perhaps a half dozen warheads, the Israelis might choose to ride it out. The Iraqis cut down on the Soviet-designed Scud’s payload, in order to extend its range. Iraqi warheads carry only about 550 pounds of explosives - less than 10 percent of the firepower of a modern warplane, noted Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens last week. Saddam Hussein “cannot harm us seriously,” Arens said on television. “Damage is limited from Iraqi missiles.” Even the prospect of a low-level chemical strike appears not to alarm the government. Israeli intelligence has indications that Iraq does have the ability to mount chemical warheads on missiles, but the containers are “too small to cause anything but localized damage,” said one intelligence official. The jerry-built warheads might not even survive the stress of launching. “It is conceivable that the actual bulk of the warhead would do more damage than the chemicals,” the official said.
A massive launch is another matter. The Kiria is monitoring satellite photos of Iraq missile sites for the telltale signs of a launch preparation-the fueling process is thought to require between 16 and 24 hours. Israel would probably have sufficient warning to send in its Air Force. That’s why preemption is still a live option. And that’s what has Washington alarmed. The gulf coalition would probably survive a strictly limited Israeli retaliation for an Iraqi attack. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have told Washington they would look the other way. “Every country has a legitimate right to defend itself,” Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said in a CNN interview last week. But Syria took strong exception to any Israeli response. An Israeli first strike would almost certainly alienate the Arab allies. Eagleburger arrived in Jerusalem with assurances that Iraqi missiles aimed at Israel are a high-priority target for American airplanes if war breaks out. Still, it is not Israel’s style to renounce any tactic or weapon. In addition, the relationship between Washington and Israel has been under strain, with predictable impact in the military sphere. “While there has been a considerable improvement in intelligence assistance and information exchange,” said military commentator Zeev Schiff, “neither the United States nor Israel wants full operational coordination, which would require full disclosure of operational plans.” Aggravating the situation is Israel’s traditional lone-wolf posture “We will decide how to answer if Saddam Hussein makes the error of attacking us,” said an Israeli military official. “In any case, this is a matter we have discussed only with ourselves.”
