Is there any danger that the Russian military might respond to the seemingly interminable political crisis in Moscow by staging a coup? Terekhov’s case shows why military intervention still seems unlikely. The armed forces themselves are deeply divided. So far, the top brass seems to tilt toward Yeltsin. But many officers in the military’s middle management-the majors and colonels and junior generals are thoroughly fed up with the social chaos and economic hardship of the post-communist era. Some commanders can no longer be certain their troops will obey them. A coup-in support of Yeltsin or on behalf of his opponents-might easily produce a further split in the military and lead to civil war. So the military has taken pains, thus far, to stay out of the political wrangling.
That hasn’t stopped the unrest in the ranks. Several months ago some people regarded Terekhov’s organization, a motley group of disgruntled officers that can claim no more than a few hundred members, as a lunatic fringe. Now commanders worry that Terekhov’s antireform activities could spread rapidly. Already, he and other officers often march at the head of nationalist and communist demonstrations, emblazoned with medals in full military splendor. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev complained to Parliament last week that at one recent union meeting “there were rallying cries to arms, to violence and to the barricades.” Grachev warned: “As a result of such thoughtless actions, one can split the armed forces. What can this bring about? Without a doubt, a massacre.”
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have become deeply demoralized. Some 200,000 demobilized officers withdrawn from Eastern Europe have no homes and no jobs. The military has lost its sense of pride and its superpower status, and officers and soldiers no longer even feel sure who is going to sign their paychecks. “If they’re put in a situation of choosing which order-the one issued by the president or the Parliament-is the more legal one, that’s more than a basis for civil war,” says Aleksandr Konovalov, director of the Center for Military Policy and Systems Analysis. “Given the confusion, you can see where a command from the top might not reach its destination.”
A poll taken last November showed that 56 percent of the military oppose government policy and that 75 percent prefer state control over the economy. Terekhov charges that the top echelons of the army have been “bribed” by the government with benefits like dachas. Middle-level officers, hit hard by a lost sense of purpose, are increasingly unhappy. Yeltsin has tripled their salaries in the past year, but that hardly compensates for inflation.
Some top generals apparently would rather not know what’s going on in the Kremlin. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, the chief of the general staff, heard about Yeltsin’s “emergency rule” speech only the day after it was delivered, when a journalist called him at his dacha. “Really?” said Kolesnikov, when the journalist suggested that the country might be heading toward a coup. “Not again.” Kolesnikov has said privately that the 70,000 troops deployed around Moscow could disperse demonstrations but would be incapable of imposing martial law on a city of 9 million people. If the army tried to overthrow Yeltsin, taking the Kremlin would be no easy feat. The president has his own private army, a regiment of around 11,000 officers and men. “There would be a terrible amount of bloodshed,” says Pavel Felgengauer, a Russian military-affairs journalist.
Still, Terekhov insists: “We need law and order. A strong leader will appear on a critical wave, and the military will unite.” He adds that the West is making a mistake by siding openly with Yeltsin. What officers want most is stability, and even many moderates are no longer sure that Yeltsin can provide it. “We don’t blindly obey orders anymore,” says Zhenya, 24, a senior lieutenant in the Dzerzhinsky division, which refused orders to occupy Moscow during the abortive coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991. But he adds: “In general, I obey the division commander. If he orders me and my men to surround the Parliament building, or the Kremlin, we’ll do it.” Zhenya’s politics have shifted. “You know, I voted for Yeltsin,” he says, “but times change.” Yeltsin may have little to fear from the armed forces, but he can no longer count on the kind of support he received from many military men less than two years ago.
