NEWSWEEK: Previous wartime relationships between Russia and the United States did not last very long. Do you think this new alliance will prove to be a turning point in Russian-American relations or just a temporary rapprochement?
Lukin: Either outcome is possible. But as we know, there is no such thing as eternal alliances in politics…Now fate is literally pulling us into an alliance, because we now face a very dangerous–and not very easily defined-common enemy. This common enemy–the international terrorist network–is the new threat of the 21st century. The fight against this enemy is a long-term one, and in this sense objective interests push in the direction of Russia and America becoming partners and allies for a long time. This is in their common interests. But both the leaders and the public [of both countries] have to recognize these interests. My impression is that the leaders have recognized them; but public opinion is a tougher problem, both in America and in Russia. There is a lot of carryover [from the past] so that many Russians, at least subconsciously, find America not to be a very appealing country, and many Americans feel the same about Russia. But I think there’s a reasonable chance for our leaders to get past this and convince their peoples that a common, allied position is the best option.
A Russian poll taken following President Putin’s expression of support for the U.S. in the wake of Sept. 11 indicates 46 percent of the Russian public consider the U.S. to be an “unfriendly power.” That figure is down from 52 percent at the beginning of the year–but still above the 43 percent that consider the U.S. a friendly power. To what extent does this anti-American attitude influence President Putin?
Of course it does influence him, because Putin is a keenly attuned politician, and he realizes that it’s not that simple to change public opinion. But this requires not just actions by Putin, but an appropriate posture from the United States. After all, what’s the reason for the Russian public’s irritation with the American position? It’s that once we destroyed all the visible reasons for the American animosity toward us–the communist regime came down, the empire came down, the army turned into one that poses no danger to the United States–it seemed as though every possibility for America to respond in kind was in place. So what happened? The Americans paternalistically slapped us on the back and said, “Nice going, guys. But we’re going to act on our own, without considering your interests at all, you’re weak now, we’re not going to pay attention to you, and we’re going to do whatever we want.” What emerged was the theory of a unipolar world, a special, de facto imperial role for America…
Recently a U.S. congressional delegation came to visit us. They began their conversation with me with some wonderful words: “What advice do you have for us in connection with Sept. 11?” This was such a surprise to me–it’s the first time I ever heard something like that from my American counterparts. If they would stick to this kind of relationship with us, mutual consultations and so forth, I think the chance for a strategic partnership would be very strong.
How important are the differences in the two countries’ national interests, for example, with regard to Iran?
Yes, we are trading certain things with Iran and you don’t like Iran. You traded with Saudi Arabia, and you liked it a lot. Now the situation has changed. How do you like Saudi Arabia now? Let’s consult with each other. Let’s not tell each other who can trade with whom or who can’t. You used to berate us and berate North Korea in every conceivable way, but then you reached agreement with it to build a heavy-water nuclear plant there under certain conditions. But before that we were going to build one, and you criticized us because we were building for a bad country. Let’s not mix up competition with strategic partnership. Yes, we’re going to sell arms because it’s profitable for us, and you sell a lot more arms than we do, because it’s profitable for you. If you have a problem, let’s consult about it.
If Washington wanted to reduce its reliance on oil from Saudi Arabia, would Russia sell oil to the U.S.?
That’s a commercial question, not a political one. What we do with regard to the sale of oil will depend on what is best for the Russian economy. Naturally we will take account of American interests if the U.S. takes account of our interests in other areas that are sensitive for us–or we won’t take account of them if the U.S. doesn’t take account of our interests. For example, in the Caspian region the Americans fairly actively disregarded our interests. Maybe we can agree that we will take account of your interests in terms of reliance on oil, and you will advise other countries in the Caspian region to transport oil through pipelines that are in our interests. These are all commercial questions and matters of mutual agreement.
How do you think the Putin-Bush negotiations on the Antiballistic MissileTreaty will develop?
There are going to have to be concessions on both sides. I think the formula that your president has used lately opens up possibilities for negotiations. He said the United States is prepared unilaterally to sharply reduce its offensive capability–which is right, and we need to reach agreement about this on a mutual basis–and that he is prepared to preserve the 1972 ABM Treaty if certain concessions are made to the U.S. on specific issues that make it possible to move toward a missile-defense system. Well, that’s a formula that could lead to an agreement, but there are still specific issues that need an answer. They have to be negotiated.
What are the chances of accomplishing the main objectives of the operation in Afghanistan–namely the elimination of the Taliban; the capture or liquidation of Osama bin Laden and his associates and the establishment of a stable Afghan government?
If the objectives have been set, they will be carried out. It’s just a matter of time.
You have called for an expansion of Russia’s role in the operation. In what specific forms would you like that to happen?
I completely agree with your president that Russia should not participate with ground troops in this operation. That would be wrong and very bad from the standpoint of Russian domestic politics–it would just worsen our people’s reaction to the operation. We have an “Afghan syndrome”–people in America can understand it well, since you had a Vietnam syndrome for a long time. Our syndrome is more recent and more serious, and it is complicated by the Chechen problems and difficulties. So I think a [Russian] ground operation is out of the question.
Does Moscow expect some kind of political or economic quid pro quo for supporting the American operation?
We are not asking or demanding any compensation, and will never demand any compensation. Taking part in this operation is above all a moral imperative for Russia. And it’s in our own interest, we are just as interested in rooting out terrorism as the U.S. It’s another matter that we were the first to come forward to help, and judging by what American officials, starting with the president, say, we are doing it very actively and effectively. That is, we extended our hand to the U.S. at a difficult moment, and I hope the U.S. also has moral principles and understands that something should probably be done in return for a country, a leadership, a friend that came forward. But that’s not our problem, that’s an American problem.
What is your general assessment of the Bush administration?
It’s still too early to judge. It consists of experienced, knowledgeable, mature people. It’s gotten into a very difficult situation now, and I think it’s acting with the proper caution and determination at the same time.
Is Moscow anxious about the possible growth of U.S. influence in Central Asia as a result of this operation?
Yes, there is some anxiety in Moscow. I think what the U.S. was doing before its intervention, trying to encircle Russia’s borders through intrigue in some well-known countries, creates an objective basis for such anxiety. At the same time I don’t see any real grounds for this anxiety. I don’t see any reason for the U.S. to leave its troops in the region for very long in the countries of Central Asia. That would produce more negative effects ultimately than positive ones. So I personally don’t have any such apprehensions. I think if the U.S. weighs the prospects of a strategic partnership with Russia against leaving its small contingents in Central Asia, it will make the right decision.
